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Finance and Divorce April 2014 Update

Jessica Craigs, senior solicitor, and David Salter, Joint Head of Family Law, both of Mills & Reeve LLP analyse the financial remedies and divorce news and cases published in March.

Jessica CraigsDavid Salter, Mills & Reeve

Jessica Craigs, Senior Solicitor, and David Salter, Joint National Head of Family Law, Mills & Reeve LLP

This update is provided into two parts:

  1. News in brief
  2. Case law update

News in brief

Detailed study into pension sharing on divorce
A report on pension sharing on divorce since its introduction in England and Wales in 2000 has been carried out by Hilary Woodward and Mark Sefton of Cardiff Law School.  The study reviewed court files, practitioners' own experience, judges' and experts' assessment of data from a sample of court files.  The conclusion reached was that pension sharing was a good weapon in the court's armoury but that it was used by only a privileged minority.  The more common approach was to offset pension against non-pension assets. 

Key points drawn from the study were as follows:

For a full copy of the report click here.

Midwives, GPs and registrars to assist with preventing family breakdown
The Telegraph reports that Work and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, is considering enlisting midwives, GPs and registrars to help reduce the levels of family breakdown.

Plans presented to ministers at the social justice cabinet meeting earlier this month promoted various professionals encouraging couples to talk about their relationships.  They will then direct the couples to one of a series of accredited relationship support services.

The proposal ties in with a report from Lord Freud that family breakdown is costing the taxpayer £46bn a year (see below).

Click here for a copy of the article.

Family breakdown 'could cost £46bn'
The Telegraph reports on Lord Freud's evaluation of the true impact of relationship breakdown on the tax payer.

Lord Freud suggests that the current £9bn cost to the tax payer is just 'the tip of the iceberg' when the full social cost of separation is taken into account.
The £9bn figure comes from the combined cost of single parent benefits and collecting maintenance payments.  He commented that this does not include the cost of children in care nor the link between family breakdown and children failing at school, becoming unemployed, getting involved in crime and suffering mental health problems; all of which create a cost to the taxpayer.

To read the article in full, click here.

Children and Families Act 2014 given royal assent on 17 March 2014
The family justice provisions, including the introduction of the new single family court, will come into force on 22 April 2014.

Family Justice and Civil Liberties Minister Simon Hughes, said:

"We are making sure the welfare of children is at the heart of the family justice system.

"We want to keep families away from the negative effects that going to court can have and to use alternative solutions when they are suitable. This is why we have changed the law to make sure that separating couples always consider mediation as an alternative to a courtroom battle.

"When cases go to court we want them to happen in the least damaging way. So we are improving processes, reducing excessive delays, and we have also changed the law so that care cases must be completed within 26 weeks."

For the full Act click here.

European Parliament approves draft anti-money laundering directive
If draft anti-money laundering rules are implemented by the European Parliament, the ultimate owners of companies and trusts will have to be listed in public registers in EU countries. The draft law would also require lawyers, banks, auditors, amongst others, to be more vigilant about suspicious transactions made by their clients.

Under the anti-money laundering directive (AMLD), as amended by MEPs, a public central register in each EU country would list information on the ultimate beneficial owners of all sorts of legal arrangements, including companies, foundations, holdings and trusts.

The registers would be interconnected across the EU and would be "publicly available following prior identification of the person wishing to access the information through basic online registration".

Changes made by the budget to CGT on main residence
The Budget has made changes to the capital gains tax rules with effect from 6 April 2014 relating to properties which have been a main residence but are no longer occupied as such.

With effect from 6 April 2014, the "last 3 years'" rule is to halve, so that tax is potentially due if the former matrimonial home is not occupied by its owner for more than 18 months before being sold.

An excellent summary of the impact of the 2014 Budget on finance and divorce cases is provided by Jan Ellis of Ellis Foster LLP.  Click here to access the article.

Case law update

Pocock v Pocock [2013] EW Misc 26 (CC)
Suspended committal order made against the ex husband who repeatedly failed to pay the mortgage on the FMH despite signing a consent order agreeing to do so.

The order was made by consent on 22 August 2011.  Both parties were legally represented.  The order was that the husband transferred to the wife the legal estate and beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home and that he undertook to pay all mortgage interest and capital payments due in respect of the mortgage and then to redeem the mortgage on or before 9th September 2011.  At the date of this hearing, the mortgage had not been redeemed; there had only been payments in respect of the interest and the regularity of those payments was questionable.

On five occasions no payment was made.  The mortgage had been brought up to date on various occasions and there were no arrears.  The wife had had to bring the matter back to court on numerous occasions and each time the husband cleared the mortgage just prior to the respective hearing.

On this occasion the husband indicated he wanted to meet the mortgage payments on a repayment basis.  The judge was sympathetic to the wife's reservations about this proposal, given the history.  Consequently the judge made an order that the husband be imprisoned for fourteen days but to be suspended upon the basis that the mortgage was paid.  The sentence was suspended for six months but referable back to court if the wife received any letters from the mortgage company that the mortgage had not been paid.

Mann v Mann [2014] EWHC 537
The original consent order for ancillary relief was made on 8 April 1999.  Each party applied to vary it; the wife to capitalise maintenance.

On 11 May 2005 Charles J handed down a full judgment disposing of the cross-applications.  He ordered the husband to pay a lump sum of £1.3m on a clean break basis; to pay child support and to pay costs of £324,000.  The husband sought leave to appeal and permission was granted on 13 October 2005 on terms that the husband provide security for costs.  The parties were invited to participate in the Court of Appeal mediation scheme and an agreement was reached which substituted a new figure of £926,000 (in lieu of the £1.3m).  The first instalment was £700,000 and was to be paid on 31 December 2006.  If an instalment was missed, the mediated agreement and consent order was dissolved and the original order of Charles J revived in full.  By 31 December 2006 the husband had paid only £315,000. 

On 21 April 2010 the wife issued a statutory demand for payment.  This claimed the husband owed her, with interest, just under £2m.  The husband applied to set the demand aside.  After a series of hearings, the parties entered into an agreement on 2 November 2011 whereby the wife withdrew her statutory demand.

The 2 November 2011 agreement ran to a number of pages and, on the face of it, included a statement that each party had received legal advice.  Following that agreement, attempts were made to set up mediation. 

Unfortunately they were unsuccessful and each party blamed the other for the failure to mediate. 

On 16 December 2013, the wife issued an application for general enforcement under FPR 2010 rule 33.3(2)(b).  The wife sought £831,252 plus interest of £1,111,408.  The husband said that the wife was debarred from proceeding to enforce by virtue of the agreement to mediate on 2 November 2011.  The wife disputed this saying that the court could not force or coerce her to mediate, whatever she agreed.

At paragraphs 12–19 Mr Justice Mostyn examines ADR in the civil sphere.  He emphasises the use of costs sanctions as a measure to persuade a party to enter negotiations.

At paragraphs 20–29, ADR in the family context is reviewed.  He comments at paragraph 22 that the FDR is a family law anomaly and consequently the need for alternative ADR processes is not as pressing a need as in the civil sphere.

At paragraph 26, Mostyn J examines the court's power under FPR rule 3.3(1)(b).  He concludes that, in family proceedings, an adjournment of proceedings to enable the parties to obtain information about ADR can be invoked but only if the parties agree to it.

He comments that if the parties have made an agreement to engage in ADR then the court can exercise its powers under rule 3.3(1)(b) even if one party is trying to back out of that agreement.

At paragraph 33, Mostyn J states that the parties in this case were bound by their agreement to mediate.  However, the agreement could not be given effect so as to prevent the wife from applying for enforcement until and unless mediation had taken place.  The most effective resolution was for the obligation to mediate under the agreement to be applicable.  However, if mediation had not taken place within eight weeks the hearing in relation to enforcement should go ahead.

Mr Justice Mostyn concluded at paragraph 36 by saying:

"I cannot compel the parties to engage in the mediation.  But I can robustly encourage them by means of an Ungley Order."

H v H [2014] EWHC 760 (Fam)
The parties were divorced in 2005.  The application before the court dated 5 November 2012 was by the husband to terminate the joint lives periodical payments order in favour of the wife made originally in 2005 and later varied on 20 June 2007.  The order was for the sum of £150,000 per annum.

The husband's application was for the 2007 order to be terminated without any further payment with effect from the date of his actual retirement from full time work as an accountant.  He had decided to retire at age 56.  The application had been entirely resisted by the wife and she maintained that his application should not be heard until the husband actually retired as the husband's financial position after retirement was not sufficiently clear or well known and, in any event, she did not believe that the husband would actually fully retire.

The wife's position chanced in the course of her oral evidence.  In closing submissions the question of the quantum of a terminating payment was considered and calculated.  Counsel for the wife (who was apparently caught a little off-guard by the wife's change in position) calculated that a final payment should be £2.6m by way of addition to the wife's current capital.  He maintained that it should be paid upon the husband's retirement in 2015 or whenever it actually occurred (if later).

The husband's did not accept that the order should take effect only from his actual retirement.  His case was predicated on the fact he wanted to be able to plan which, he said, was his underlying motive for the application now.  The tragic feature of the case was that his second wife (aged only 41) was seriously ill with terminal cancer.  Her prognosis was not to survive beyond two years.  The husband wanted to be in a position to parent their two young children, full time after the death of his wife.

The husband and wife were both aged 55.  The parties met in 1980 when they were trainee accountants at a well known firm.  They were married on 30 July 1983 and the same year, the husband qualified as an accountant.  The wife qualified in 1984 and initially secured work at a major London department store as the manager of their internal audit department.

The husband pursued a successful career with a major international financial services firm.  He remained with that organisation since starting in 1984.  In 1985 the wife became the group accountant for an investment trust which was the parent company of the department store.

In 1986 the parties moved to west London.  In the same year, the wife began to work for a competitor department store as their chief accountant.  She continued to do so until 1990 where she ceased working and took favourable redundancy terms.  In total the wife worked in steadily improving positions for about six years prior to starting a family.

The parties had a son and daughter.  In January 1992 the parties moved to the Far East where the husband was made a partner of the Far Eastern office. 
In 1995, just prior to returning to England, the parties bought a new home in West London which was their final matrimonial home.  In 1996 the couple returned to this country and in the same year the husband was made a full partner in the parent UK company.

In August 2004 the parties separated and on 22 December 2004 the wife presented her petition for divorce.  On 17 June 2005, decree nisi was pronounced.

On 3 August 2005, matters were compromised at the FDR appointment. At that time the assets were put at £2.43m.  They consisted of: the matrimonial home, the husband's pension, the wife's own savings of about £287,000 and the husband's savings of a similar amount.  At the time, the husband's income was said to be £475,000 per year net and he was destined to retire at 55. 

As a result of the negotiation, the matrimonial home was transferred to the wife and a periodical payments order was made in her favour at the rate of £90,000 per annum.  In addition, the husband was ordered to pay periodical payments for the children at the rate of £15,000 per annum for their daughter and £5,000 per annum for the son.  The husband paid the school fees.  This equated to approximately 74% of the liquid assets in the case to the wife.  The husband retained his pension assets and the balance.  There was no pension sharing order because the wife retained her whole life claim for periodical payments.

On 20 July 2006 the wife issued an application for variation of the periodical payments order.  There was some discussion about her motive but the case of Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 had been reported and the emphasis on the wife's compensation claim was assessed.

By consent, the wife's maintenance was varied so that periodical payments were increased to £150,000 per annum to the wife.

The husband remarried in May 2006 and have two children aged 5 and 2. 

In July 2012 the husband's solicitors informed the wife of his intention to retire when he was 56. 

At paragraph 49, Mr Justice Coleridge draws the following eight conclusions:

  1. The wife had been properly and fairly treated by the previous orders.  This was not an opportunity to try and backtrack and reargue or reopen the history of the case.
  2. It was highly desirable to bring about a clean break if it could be done fairly.
  3. The parties had been separated for 10 years.  The husband wanted certainty for his financial future.
  4. The husband's retirement was around the corner and now in prospect.  He wanted to know what his position was post-retirement.
  5. The husband's present wife's illness made it even more desirable for the husband to achieve a termination.
  6. There is still acrimony between the husband and his (first) wife.
  7. It was possible and right to terminate the order now without causing undue hardship.
  8. This case does retain a tangible, obvious compensation element which deserves recognition one way or another.

The judge accepted the wife's budget was approximately £70,000 per annum.  This was cross-checked against her ability to save from the periodical payments order.  She had savings of approximately £1m.  However, to ensure generosity to the wife he added approximately £10,000 per annum.

The compensation element was not overlooked.  First the judge attributed only £500,000 of the equity in the FMH as part of her long term income fund.  A return of 3.75% was assessed as appropriate for this fund.  Secondly, the savings of £1m were attributed an annual return of 3.75% rather than a fully amortised capital basis.  Thirdly, no step down was factored in.  Lastly, the judge ignored any extra savings the wife was able to make between now and when the husband actually retired.

Therefore, to achieve £80,000 per annum the wife's resources of approximately £55,000 were deducted.  To ensure the additional £25,000, a simply Duxbury calculation was required to bridge the gap.  The sum of £400,000 as a lump sum was ordered to be payable on the husband's actual retirement.

Luckwell v Limata [2014] EWHC 502
A claim by the husband for financial provision on divorce.  The parties had entered into a pre-marital agreement and agreed that he would not make any claim either during or after the marriage in relation to the wife's separate property or to gifts made or to be made to her by her wealthy family. 

If the pre-marital agreement had not been made, the marriage would not have taken place.

At the time of the hearing, costs were substantial.  The husband had no assets in his name.  The wife had an unencumbered house worth about £6.7m.  Neither spouse had any significant income.

The hearing was heard in public and the wife's family attended (albeit with a brief exclusion of the father during the wife's evidence).

The wife came from a wealthy family.  Her parents were divorced when she was 20.  The wife was bought her first home by her parents in London around the same time.  In 2002 her mother purchased and gave her another home in London.  The first property was sold and the wife's mother kept the net proceeds.

In 2004 the husband and wife began living together.  In February 2005 the couple got engaged and in March 2005 the wife fell pregnant.  In April 2005 the wife ceased working and did not return to paid employment after that date.  The wedding date was advanced due to the pregnancy and was set for 23 July 2005.

On 11 July 2005 both parties signed the pre-marital agreement.  Legal advice was given to both parties and full and accurate financial disclosure was made and summarised in the agreement.  The agreement referred to and identified separate property and recorded that each party had acquired separate property independently of the other.

A supplemental agreement was entered into on 18 June 2006 after the wife's parents contributed further funds to a large house used by the couple as their home.  Again, this was based upon, and recorded, full and frank financial disclosure and was signed after independent legal advice.

In December 2007 the parties moved from this house into the wife's father's house at 26 Connaught Square.  Soon afterwards the father offered to the wife (and not the husband) to give the house to the wife.  There were two conditions: (1) there must be a second supplemental agreement making specific reference to Connaught Square; and (2) the wife had to promise to her father, which she did, that she would never sell, mortgage or charge Connaught Square without his prior consent.

The promise given by the wife to her father was a key consideration of the case.  The father had said that if the wife were to sell or mortgage the property he would withdraw his financial support and refuse to pay the children's school fees.  The judge accepted the father's evidence on this point.

The second supplemental agreement was dated 28 February 2008.  It was intended to be read in conjunction with the first supplemental agreement and was, in many respects, a carbon copy.

The couple went on to have two more children.  In April 2012, the husband became unemployed and remained so for the rest of the marriage.  On 18 November 2012, after an incident in the pub where the husband broke a glass against his head, the husband left the FMH and never returned on a full time basis.

Due to an unpleasant incident, the wife made an application for a non-molestation order.  Since that date, the relationship between the parties deteriorated rapidly.

The wife continued to live in the FMH and enjoy a number of foreign holidays.  The husband, by comparison, moved from room to room in his own mother's bed and breakfast.  When the hotel was full, he slept on the sofa.

In November 2013, the husband rented a property close to the FMH. He could not afford to do so and he had no means of paying the rent.

At paragraph 133, Mr Justice Holman states:

"There is no doubt that very great weight indeed should be given to the agreements in this case.  There are no vitiating factors such as duress or non-disclosure.  They were entered into freely by a mature man after expert legal advice."

At paragraph 138 he goes on to say:

"On the facts of this case there is only one consideration which is capable of outweighing the above considerations and capable of having the effect that the agreements should not be applied rigorously and to the letter.  That consideration is current and likely future need." 

He revisits paragraphs 77 (children), 78 (autonomy), 79 (non-matrimonial property) and 80 (unforeseen circumstances) of Radmacher and repeats paragraph 81 and 82 in relation to needs which states: "…it is…needs…which can most readily render it unfair to hold the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement."

The need of the husband to be able to provide a home for the children when they were with him was a significant factor.  Consequently, despite the effect this may have on the wife's housing and her father's withdrawal of financial support (including an allowance to the wife and the children's school fees), the judge made capital provision in favour of the husband.

A capital sum was ordered to be made available to the husband of £900,000.  The husband was allowed use, but not ownership of the property until the youngest child reached 22 years.  At that stage, the property was to be sold.  45% of the net proceeds then reverted to the wife.  The balance was to be reinvested in a smaller home for the use of the husband for the rest of his life.  In addition the wife was ordered to make capital available to the husband to meet his CGT liability, clear his debts and put him in funds to purchase furniture.  The total was approximately £1,240,000 leaving the wife net equity in the home of approximately £5,500,000.

Mr Justice Holman concludes at paragraph 166 as follows:

"This is a decision and judgment based entirely upon the needs of Frankie [the husband], considered in conjunction with his role as father. Whilst not implementing the agreements, it still affords great weight to them. But for the agreements, I would have awarded a larger housing fund and the whole of it outright. As it is, all of it is provided only for a term, and much of it only during the dependency of the children. He only ever gets the use of it in the form of housing. He can never touch the capital."

[Note: a further judgment in this case was handed down by Holman J on the 9th April. It will be reviewed in a future update. That judgment can be read here.]

Gohil v Gohil [2014] EWCA Civ 274
Financial remedy proceedings were concluded in 2004 with the wife agreeing to a clean break despite her suspicions that the husband had not made a full disclosure of his assets.

Mrs Gohil issued a divorce petition in May 2002 upon her husband's alleged adultery and unreasonable behaviour.  Decree nisi was pronounced in March 2003 and made absolute following conclusion of the financial remedy proceedings, in 2004.

The ancillary relief proceedings were not straightforward.  The principal issue between the parties related to the extent to which the husband had provided full or even adequate disclosure.   At the time he was a solicitor in a small practice based in London.  His disclosure demonstrated that he had very limited resources in his own name.  In contrast to the information disclosed, the wife asserted that the husband's expenditure and lifestyle indicated that his financial worth was significantly greater than the figures disclosed.

The matter was compromised at the FDR.  The wife was unable to prove her assertions that the husband had considerable resources available to him.

In 2007, following a Crown Court trial, it transpired that the husband had been involved and was found guilty of four offences of fraud and money laundering valued at over £20million.  Two weeks later he pleaded guilty to a number of further charges including fraud and six counts of money laundering valued at approximately £37 million.  He was sentenced to a total term of 10 years imprisonment.

On 3 July 2007 the wife issued an application to set aside the consent order of 30 April 2004 on the grounds of alleged serious material non-disclosure, fraud and misrepresentation by the husband.  The application to set aside was not determined for over five years but concluded on 25 September 2012 with a decision by Mr Justice Moylan to set aside the following paragraph of the order:

"[T]he petitioner's claims for all forms of capital provision (to include property adjustment, lump sum and pension sharing orders) and pension orders do stand dismissed."

The husband appealed on bases that included:

  1. A judge at first instance has no jurisdiction to set aside an order granting substantive financial relief made by another judge of equivalent status at first instance.
  2. In any event, the judge sitting at first instance, had no jurisdiction to proceed (as he purposed to do) on the basis of the principles set out in Ladd v Marshall (which authority sets out principles upon which an appellate court may admit fresh evidence).
  3. If the judge did have jurisdiction to set aside the original order on the basis of material non-disclosure, he could only properly exercise that jurisdiction once it had been proved that material non-disclosure had occurred.

The appeal was allowed.

Lord Justice McFarlane (at paragraph 95) sympathised with the wife and Moylan J.  However he said it was correct to identify the two distinct stages involved in a Livesey v Jenkins application i.e. (1) determining as, a matter of fact, whether there has been material non-disclosure and (2) if so, determining whether the original order should be set aside.  Any consideration of whether fresh evidence should be admitted can only be within the first stage and, probably, at a preliminary point in that stage.

He commented that had Moylan J adjourned the matter to a full fact finding hearing, then the judge would be likely to be in a position to determine with precision and clarity whether any material non-disclosure had actually been established to the requisite standard of proof.  But, what was not legally permissible was to go from the preliminary stage of allowing the reception of fresh evidence to making an order actually setting aside the 2004 order without any proper fact finding hearing.

Matthews v Matthews [2014] EWCA Civ 1874
Appeal by the wife against an order by Mostyn J in financial remedy proceedings. 

The parties began living together in 2006 and after various separations and reconciliations, were married in June 2009.  They had two children (F – age 6 and N – age 3).  The parties separated in February 2010 and they were divorced in 2012.

The husband was a self-employed plumber.  His earning capacity was assessed at around £27,000 per annum.  At the time of the hearing he lived in West London with his new partner.

The wife worked in the compliance sector of the financial industry.  In 2012 she worked for a high street bank and was earning £43,000 per annum.  Unfortunately she was made redundant from that post and was unable to find employment since, apart from on a self-employed basis within the insurance sector.  The judge assessed her earning capacity as around £40,000 per annum.  At that time she was living in a rented house in Berkshire with the two children.  The husband had no contact with the children.

The judge at first instance carried out a careful examination of the parties' assets and liabilities.  The net effect of the order made was that the wife would own three flats outright and the husband one flat, unless it was sold (which was the default position).

The wife had made an application for nominal periodical payments to be effective until such time as the children achieved their majority.  The judge determined that there was no reason for this as the wife had a higher earning capacity and therefore a clean break should be instituted.

The wife appealed that part of the judgment.  The grounds for appeal for which permission was given was that the judge was wrong to dismiss the application for nominal spousal maintenance in circumstances where the appellant had two dependant children living with her.  The wife submitted that the judge failed to take into account that she might struggle to obtain full-time work and she therefore might be without work for substantial periods of time.

At paragraph 15 of the judgment, Lord Justice Tomlinson says:

"We are here concerned with an exercise of discretion but it is an exercise of discretion in which Parliament has indicated that there should be a clear presumption in favour of making a clean break, in the sense that that is something which the court is mandated to consider, whether it would be appropriate to bring about a complete break between the parties, so far as concerns financial matters, as an initial consideration."

The appeal was therefore unanimously dismissed.

Chai v Peng [2014] EWHC 750 (Fam)
Application by the wife for further maintenance pending suit.

Mr Justice Holman was critical of the time estimate provided of one day.  He was presented with several lever arch files all of which he was expected to read and digest before giving judgment.  He therefore dealt with it on an 'extremely broad brush' approach.

The parties were married for around 42 years.  They had five adult children.  The husband is aged 74 and appeared to primarily live in Malaysia.  The wife (aged 68) lives in England.  The husband was said to be a very rich man.  The wife had little significant assets.

The wife commenced divorce proceedings in England.  The husband immediately countered by saying that at the date of the proceedings the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the application.  He also started his own proceedings in Malaysia.

The legal costs were described as 'eye-watering'.  The wife had incurred legal costs in England of around £920,000.  In Malaysia she has incurred costs to date of around £95,000.  The husband's costs (net of VAT as he was not liable to pay it) were around £567,000.

The judge noted at paragraph 6 that neither party was a British citizen.  Neither paid taxes in England and yet they had spent about 6 days in the English courts.  He commented:

"Very serious issues ought to arise as to just how much time of an English court these parties should be able to take up on these preliminary skirmishes, whilst squeezing out the many needy litigations who need precious court time to recover their children from abduction or seek their return from case, and other such issues."

The judge continued to stress the phenomenal amount of costs envisaged and encouraged both the parties and their advisors to negotiate.  In a frank statement, at paragraph 8, he states:

"Beyond any possible doubt this husband is going to have to make fair payment to the wife.  the yardstick of fairness can be discussed and assessed quite separately from consideration of whether English or Malaysian rules may ultimately apply to resolution of financial relief."

In 2013 the husband had agreed to make two upfront payments of about £1.85m 'on account of the wife's claims in any jurisdiction for financial provision from the breakdown of the marriage'.  Mr Justice Holman found that the wording was ambiguous as to how long that payment was due to last.

The judge considered the wife's needs on the basis of what was reasonable and made a 'short, interim and impressionistic' order for payments on account of any substantial award made anywhere in the world.  The husband was ordered to pay £35,000 per month for the period of two months up to the next hearing and £100,000 on account towards the wife's costs.