AlphabiolabsBerkeley Lifford Hall Accountancy ServicesIQ Legal Training

Home > Articles > 2018 archive

Finance & Divorce Update March 2018

Rose-Marie Drury, senior associate, Mills & Reeve LLP, analyses the news and case law relating to financial remedies and divorce during February 2018.

Rose-Marie Drury, Senior Associate, Mills & Reeve LLP

As usual, this month's updated is divided into two parts:

Part A. News in brief

President issues fresh guidance on jurisdiction and allocation in the Family Court

Emphasising that there remains "considerable confusion" concerning the extent and exercise of the power of Family Court judges to transfer a case to the High Court, the President has issued detailed guidance covering, amongst other things, the Family Court and its relationship with the High Court, the jurisdiction of the Family Court, the allocation of matters as between the Family Court and the High Court, the allocation of matters within the Family Court and the transfer of cases between the Family and High Courts. 

The guidance also highlights that a transfer of a case to the High Court to be heard by a High Court judge is not the same things as allocating a case within the Family Court to a judge of High Court level.

You can read the guidance here

Latest ONS marriage figures underline need for legal reform

The ONS' Marriages in England and Wales: 2015 report reveals that marriage rates for opposite-sex couples were the lowest on record and that marriage at older ages rose.  The statistics serve, some say, to underline the need for the reform of cohabitation law and the formal recognition of pre-nuptial agreements.  For the report click here

Prudential survey shows costs of divorce hit retirement income

Divorcees planning to retire in 2018 can expect their income to drop by £3,800 compared to those who've never divorced, highlights a new survey by Prudential.  For details click here and here

A rise in divorces involving cryptocurrencies

A number of law firms have come forward saying that they are seeing a rise in divorces involving cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ripple or Ethereum. The cryptocurrencies can prove to be a traceability nightmare particularly given that there is no centralised system or opportunity to freeze these assets.  The currencies also tend to fluctuate more in value so, even when they are disclosed or uncovered, numerous valuations may be needed over the length of contested proceedings.

Part B. Cases

WS v HS [2018] EWFC 11

H and W separated in 2016 after approximately 25 years of marriage. They had three children, one in tertiary education, and two in secondary education (Q being a day pupil in lower sixth form and R a pre-GCSE boarder).

The family home is referred to by the judge as "The Homestead" was owned in joint names and subject to a mortgage. W remained living at the property and H lived at the couple's second home, a holiday house. W had been a home-maker for many years and H had been a CEO of a company earning at one time £250,000 but the company had gone into liquidation four months ago and he was now in receipt of job seeker's allowance.

In 2017 W issued divorce proceedings. Voluntary Forms E were exchanged pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate. In Form E W confirmed her agreement to the sale of the Homestead but a dispute arose in relation to timing of the sale.

The Homestead had been on the market for sale for approximately two years at an initial asking price of £950,000. An offer had bene made at £890,000, although then withdrawn and the marketing price reduced to £850,000. In October 2017 the parties received an offer of £775,000 which was increased to £785,000.

H wished to accept the offer whilst W opposed the sale and indicated that the property should be retained for 18 months or more whilst Q completed her A levels.  W indicated that a sale at £785,000 would be a significant undervalue and that she would take responsibility for the mortgage repayments until resolution of the financial settlement. 

In November 2017 H issued an application for financial relief seeking a lump sum order, property adjustment order in respect of the Homestead and a pension sharing order. H then issued an application under Part 18 FPR 2010 for an interim order for sale of the Homestead. No jurisdictional basis for the order was set out in the application.

At the hearing before the District Judge W's counsel conceded in his position statement that rule 20.2(1)(c)(v) FPR 2010 endowed the court with the power to order a sale of the property. W argued though that the court ought to be slow to make an interim order which had the effect of materially influencing the outcome of the substantive dispute.

The District Judge concluded that there was good reason why it was desirable to sell the property. In particular:

i. The parties had agreed some time ago that the property should be sold.
ii. A sale would help to stem significant outgoings and preserve the family's depleted funds.
iii. The property needed to be sold at some point and the current offer was the best likely to be received in the current and foreseeable climate. 

iv. There were suitable alternative properties for the parties to rent or purchase.

W appealed on the basis that the judge had failed to properly exercise his discretion and had failed to recognise that the FPR did not give him jurisdiction to terminate W's right of occupation of the Homestead and an application should have been made to determine the occupation rights of the wife under s33 Family Law Act (FLA) 1996. During the appeal W conceded s33 FLA could not be used to restrict or terminate her property rights as she had a right to occupy the property by virtue of her legal and beneficial interest. s33(3)(d) FLA 1996 only gave the court power to prohibit, suspend or restrict W's right to occupy the Homestead and that would be insufficient to oust her in order to achieve vacant possession on sale.  If an inferred or deemed application under the FLA 1996 could not terminate W's rights of occupation than a procedural rule could not achieve that end. 

H argued that rule 20.2(1)(c)(v) FPR 2010 bestowed the power to order the sale and vacant possession of the property, given the financial explosion experienced by the family and against the backdrop of W's previous agreement to the sale the judge was right to conclude that there was 'good reason' for the sale. Finally, he argued it was debateable whether BR v VT [2015] EWHC 2727 (Fam) had been properly decided insofar as it pertained to the requirements of the FLA 1996 and, in any case, that Mostyn J's comments about sale were obiter as the H in that case had been the sole owner (which was not the case here). An order for sale would be the only would be the only order to bring financial sanity to the family.

Cobb J granted permission for the appeal and then dealt with the substantive appeal.

Cobb J noted that the only substantive application before the court was H's application for limited and specific forms of financial relief under s23 and s24 Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973. The orders sought by the husband could only be made on or after granting a decree of divorce or nullity and could not take effect until the decree was made absolute. When such orders were made they could be accompanied and were capable of being enforced by an order for sale pursuant to s24A MCA 1973.

Exceptionally the court could make an order for sale under s24A MCA 1973 to give effect to a legal services order under s22ZA MCA 1973. Save for this limited exception it was well-established that an order for sale under s24A MCA 1973 could not be made as an interim measure.

The FPR could not extend the court's jurisdiction which, in the absence of the rules the court would otherwise lack.

Cobb J noted though that the court possesses the power to make interim orders for sale of matrimonial property under s17 Married Women's Property Act (MWPA) 1882 and sections 13 and 14 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TOLATA) 1996.

Cobb J considered that Mostyn J in BR v BT had correctly questioned the dicta in Wicks v Wicks [1998] 1 FLR 470 that an order for sale did not include an order for possession, relying, as Mostyn J did, on Short v Short [1960] 1 WLR 833.

Sections 13 and 14 TOLATA 1996 not only gave the court power to order the sale but also to order that a beneficiary should give vacant possession of the land.

Therefore, either an application under the MWPA 1882 or TOLATA 1996 would give the court the inherent power to order vacant possession of the property. However, a formal application under one of those statutes must be made before it could be properly entertained. It would not be right for application of this nature to be deemed to have been made, or otherwise inferred.

It was only once a substantive jurisdiction was laid before the court that the court could consider how, procedurally it should exercise its power and that FPR rule 20 came into play. Even if FPR r20.2 operated to give the court a free-standing power to order sale it would not have given the court the power to order the delivery up of vacant possession. For those reasons in BR v BT Mostyn J had conducted a s33(6) FLA 1996 exercise on the basis that the wife in that case only had home rights under s33(3)(e) FLA 1996 which the court could terminate.

In this case the District Judge had not undertaken a section 33(6) FLA 1996 exercise but even if he had he could not have terminated W's rights of occupation under s33(1)(a)(i) FLA 1996 because the court only had power to prohibit, suspend or restrict her rights of occupation.

Cobb J went on to comment that in any case he had misgivings about purporting to terminate a wife's rights of occupation of the former matrimonial home simply on the basis of a deemed application under the FLA 1996 on the basis that:

i. A spouse with 'home rights' if in occupation has a right not to be evicted or excluded from the matrimonial home or any part of it by the other spouse except by an order under the statue (Part V FLA 1996).

ii. The powers vested in the court by Part IV of the FLA 1996 are Draconian and restricted to exceptional cases. Exceptional relief should not generally spring from a deemed or assumed jurisdiction.
iii. A s33 FLA 1996 order cannot be made of the court's own motion (unlike a non-molestation order). It is clear from the rules that an application for an occupation order must be made in writing and supported by a statement of evidence (r10.2 FPR). Although the court had the general power to take any step or make any order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective (r4.1(3)(o) FPR 2010 he was far from convinced that the court should deploy that rule to provide a jurisdiction for the making of such a significant order, particularly when the court had distinguished between the ability to grant non-molestation orders of its own motion but not occupation orders.
iv. There is a material difference between termination of home rights under s33(3)(e) FLA 1996 and the prohibition, restriction or suspension under s33(3)(d). He did not consider and counsel did not argue that this was synonymous with termination and a 'prohibition' could not be used to exclude a wife during the period of the conveyance simply so as to give vacant possession.
v. As a wife's legal and beneficial interest cannot be 'terminated' under the FLA 1996 it would not be right to seek to do so by conducting a s33(6) FLA 1996 exercise before reaching a conclusion that such rights ought to be extinguished.

Assuming there was a proper application before the court to which rule 20.2(1)(c)(v) could attach how then did the court apply the procedural steps required? This was a two stage test:

1. The applicant must establish there is a good reason for a sale. What constitutes a good reason will be decided in each case on its own facts.

2. How should the court exercise its discretion? These will include the factors reflected in the relevant statute, under MWPA 1882 these are 'essentially unlimited' but were more fully defined in s15 for a TOLATA 1996 claim. If a party needed to terminate a spouse's home rights under s33 FLA 1996 then the provisions of s33(6) would be considered.

Under either statue the court will consider all other relevant circumstances and if a 'good reason' is made out for a sale 'this will be a powerful factor in the discretionary exercise' and the weight to be given to competing or collateral considerations will depend on the circumstances of the case.
W's appeal was allowed and the order of the District Judge set aside on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction.

Even if he was wrong analysis that there was no proper application before him on which to make an interim order for sale he was satisfied the District Judge had not applied the two stage test required by rule 20, only one of his grounds (the financial imperative) could be relied upon as a 'good reason' but his judgment had not shown an interim sale would make a significant difference to the family's finances, the judge had been wrong to weigh in his consideration of 'good reason' the fact alternative accommodation would be available to the parties and he had not conducted the relevant exercise of s33(6) FLA 1996.

Kerman v Akhmedova [2018] EWCA Civ 307
This case is the latest in a chain of reported cases arising from W and H's financial remedy proceedings to which the second respondents was Woodblade Limited and the third respondent was Cotor Investment SA ('Cotor'), a Panamanian company.

The appeal does not concern the outcome of the financial remedy proceedings in which W was awarded a total of £453,576,152 out of wealth found by Haddon-Cave J to amount to £1,092,334,626 (largely held by Cotor as H's nominee and on bare trust for H) and H took no part in the appeal.  The appeal instead concerns the extent of legal professional privilege for H's former solicitor.

The full background of the proceedings is set out in the previously reported cases namely AAZ v BBZ and Others (Financial Remedies: Sharing Principle: Special Contribution) [2016] EWHC 3234 (Fam), Z v Z and others (Legal Professional Privilege: Fraud Exemption) [2016] EWHC 3349 (Fam) and AAZ v BBZ and Ors [2016] EWHC 3361 (Fam) and. It is the Z v Z and others judgment from which the appeal arises.

At the final hearing in the financial remedy proceedings, W gave evidence regarding the role played by H's longstanding solicitor, Mr Kerman, in arranging insurance for a modern art collection held by Cotor and evidence that he had played a role in other aspects of H's financial affairs.

On the final day of the final hearing (5 December 2016) W was given permission to issue a witness summons on 12 December 2016 for Mr Kerman to attend court on 15 December 2016.  

Mr Kerman duly attended on 15 December, accompanied by Counsel, and gave evidence that he had acted for H, Cotor and Woodblade Ltd. Mr Kerman raised objections on the grounds of legal professional privilege about the extent of questions asked and applied to set aside the summons. Haddon-Cave J ruled against the objections. Mr Kerman then answered questions regarding the art collection and a portfolio held by Cotor on 16 December 2016 in which it emerged that H had moved the modern art collection to a new repository in November 2016 and some $600m of Cotor's portfolio of over $890m had been transferred in November into a new trust vehicle in another country in another name.

In light of the evidence Mr Kerman was ordered on 16 December 2016 to produce documents regarding the modern art collection and portfolio on the basis that the evidence demonstrated H had taken deliberate steps to make enforcement of any monetary award by the court more difficult. Mr Kerman and Kerman & Co were further ordered not to disclose the provisions of the order to any other person, including the Respondents but excluding W, her legal advisors and Mr Kerman's legal advisors. 

A further order was then made on 20 December 2016 prohibiting Mr Kerman from disclosing the judgment in Z v Z and others to anyone other than W, her legal advisors or Mr Kerman's legal advisors.

Mr Kerman appealed on four grounds. The first ground was legal professional privilege and the remaining grounds related to the process by which Mr Kerman was brought to court and the propriety of the gagging orders made.
Mr Kerman argued that in relation to legal professional privilege, Haddon-Cave J had been wrong to conclude that he was acting qua a man of business not a legal advisor. In relation to the fraud exception he argued that Haddon-Cave J had applied the wrong legal test and did not find H's conduct to have been fraudulent or dishonest, nor would he have been entitled to do so.

In relation to the remaining grounds Mr Kerman raised the following complaints:

i. W should have proceeded to obtain freezing orders against H and Cotor before obtaining evidence from him.

ii. There had been non-compliance with the requirements of s.31G Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and FPR Parts 21 and 24 as the proceedings were no longer on foot at the time the summons was issued and the application for the witness summons was not supported by evidence. 

iii. He had been ambushed. There was inadequate notice of the witness summons and the order dated 16 December 2016. In particular, there was a failure to give him notice of the issues on which he was to give evidence and to provide him with the evidence being relied on to justify that privilege would not apply because of the fraud exception.

iv. No notice was given to H or Cotor of the order dated 5 December 2016 or 16 December 2016 which deprived them of an opportunity to intervene.

v. Gagging orders should not have been imposed.

vi. The gagging orders were expressed to be until further order rather than until a specified date and although the parties reached an agreement on 5 January 2017 to discharge the gagging orders, which was reflected in a sealed order by the court on 7 February 2017, it was not until 21 February 2017 that he was told that the order had been sealed.

vii. The order dated 5 December 2016 contained no undertaking in damages in favour of him.

viii. Haddon-Cave J refused to give him permission to appeal and to stay the orders against him pending appeal.

Giving the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal Munby P held:

On the issue of legal professional privilege Mr Kerman had been asked questions which, had H been asked, he would not have been able to rely upon legal advice privilege since they related to his communications with third parties. Mr Kerman had not asserted litigation privilege and in the context of legal advice privilege communications between a solicitor and a third party were not privileged. It was therefore not necessary to determine whether Haddon-Cave J had applied the correct test for the fraud exception.

In relation to the remaining grounds:

i. Haddon-Cave J had been justified in proceeding as he did. W understandably wanted information supplied by Mr Kerman as to the whereabouts of the assets before embarking upon obtaining freezing injunctions so that the relief sought could be more specifically focused and targeted, Mr Kerman was an obvious potential source of that information and was no longer on the record in the financial remedy proceedings as acting for H.

ii. Proceedings were still on foot. Whilst the final hearing concluded on 5 December 2016 judgment was still awaited and the final order between the parties made clear that a clean break did not take effect until there had been full compliance. 

Haddon-Cave J had a wealth of evidence to make the orders. There was no need for him to require further evidence, let alone further written evidence.

iii. The shortness of the notice given to Mr Kerman had the effect of reducing the period of embarrassment to which he would be exposed were he to be contacted by H or Cotor.

The witness summons was in the statutory form and identified the claim, one with which Mr Kerman was very familiar having at one time been acting in proceedings for H. So long as the witness summons is in the relevant statutory form it is not a requirement to give recipient details of the issues on which he is to give evidence.

If more time had been required, then the remedy was to seek more time or if that application was not allowed then to make an immediate application to the Court of Appeal. That was not done.

iv. The fact that no notice was given to H and Cotor was not surprising for W had every reason to fear if alerted further attempts would be made by them to move or secrete assets.  This was a 'very plain and obvious case' for proceedings without notice.

v. Anti-tipping off orders are a well–recognised feature of practice in the courts. The present case called for such an order. Had H been told Mr Kerman had been summonsed there was a risk H would have moved the assets. The order also protected Mr Kerman from the embarrassment he might otherwise have found himself in given his ongoing duties to H and Cotor as his former clients.

vi. The order should have been granted for a specified period and not until further order but this did not entitle Mr Kerman to any relief.

The delay in Mr Kerman finding out the order had been sealed was not a valid criticism of W's solicitors who were entitled to assume that the court would have provided a sealed copy of the order to Mr Kerman.

vii. There could be no question of a witness summons being required or it being appropriate to contain an undertaking in damages. A witness summons is not an equitable remedy and an undertaking in damages is a creature of equity.

Neither principle nor practice indicated any requirement for an undertaking in damages in an anti-tipping off order.

viii. If the matter was so pressing the remedy was to make an immediate application to the Court of Appeal.

A v A [2018] EWHC 340 (Fam)
H and W married in 1983 and had 5 children. They separated in 2009 and divorced in 2011. During the marriage W was a homemaker and H set up a successful construction business.

On 15 September 2011 a consent order was approved which included, amongst other things:

i. Pay the deposit of £260,000;

ii. Take out a mortgage of £2.49m which he would service;

iii. Until sale of RG, H agreed to provide W with the sum of £12,000 to meet her living expenses. 

At the time of the consent order RG had been valued at £7.5 m and also £7m-£8m but the parties had been advised it could reach £10m. It was unclear where the valuation of the Spanish property came from but both parties agreed it was worth £3.75m.

Had the properties sold somewhere near the expected prices W would have BL unencumbered, liquid capital of somewhere between £3m-£4m on midpoint figures and the pensions. 

In the intervening period neither property sold. There was one offer on RG of £6m which both parties agreed to reject and an offer of £2m and then £1.75m on the Spanish property.

Meanwhile H's businesses, which had been loss-making, prospered.

In March 2017 the matter came before HHJ Hughes QC in relation to marketing of the Spanish property and W's applied for a variation of the maintenance agreement and to be released from her undertaking to repay monies to H. 

HHJ Hughes adopted the figures in the preliminary documents which showed if RG sold for £6m and the Spanish property for £1.75m after repaying the BL deposit, mortgage interest payments and loan as at August 2017 W would be left with £819,000.

At the final hearing:

The judge founded her reasoning on the basis that:

i. Each party had been reasonable in their efforts to sell the properties.

ii. She was "quite sure" that W would not have agreed to pay her own maintenance and mortgage interest repayments by way of a loan had she known how long this would go on for, how much it would have cost her and how much it would deplete her capital funds.

iii. W would have been unlikely to have had her claims for maintenance dismissed in six months and replaced by an arrangement whereby she was lent money to maintain herself in a new home which would be repayable on an increasing basis if either of the parties had known that the properties would be unsold after six years.

iv. H had acted to his detriment by making the payments that he had made in reliance on the terms of the agreement.

v. The failure to sell the properties was a major and significant change and one which the court could not ignore. Had W received £2 million as a Duxbury fund in 2011 this would have provided her with an annual income of £89,000. In contrast the sum of £800,000 would provide her with an annual income of around £40,000.

vi. The cost to H of paying £12,000 pcm plus the mortgage interest was a total of £216,000 p.a. In three/four years, if the properties remain unsold, W's entire capital fund would have been removed as it would all be owed to H.

vii. It was not foreseeable in 2011 that, after a short period of time, H's businesses would be so successful as to provide him with substantial income and capital.

The judge concluded that relying on Birch v Birch [2017] UKSC 53 the court had power to release a person from undertakings given to the court if just to do so or conditionally by release if the person was to give a different, fairer, undertaking in substitution. The one fact in the case which might allow her to release W from her undertaking was the delay in selling the properties and the fact that had either party known that the properties would remain unsold after six years, W would have been unlikely to have her claims for maintenance dismissed and replaced by an arrangement whereby she was lent money which she would have to repay. The fair way forward was to release W from her undertakings to repay the mortgage interest and the maintenance to the extent that she receives the original £1.3m from H upon the sale of RG and £700,00 upon the sale of the Spanish property.

Following the delivery of judgment, H sought clarification as to whether or not it was the judge's intention H should continue paying the mortgage interest and monthly payment and, if not, to discharge H from his undertaking.  The judge's response was that W could not pay her bills without the assistance of H and; "It seems to me that, as between the two of them in the circumstances in regard to the housing which pertain, it is not unfair for him to continue to support the wife….. As the bread-winner he has always been responsible for his own support and that of the wife and, in my view, it is not unjust for him to continue to do so, given his large income and the paucity of that of the wife left to her own devices."

H appealed and argued that:

i. This was a consent order carefully negotiated and crafted over months of negotiation. It was intended to provide the parties with a clean break.

ii. The parties' agreement is a matter of the utmost importance and should, unless there is a very good reason otherwise, be respected.

iii. This order would not be set aside if the Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 or Myerson v Myerson [2009[ 2 FLR 147 principles were applied. The failure to sell at the estimated prices was foreseeable.

iv. There was no minimum figure contained in the agreement which W might receive and had she wanted a minimum figure she should have negotiated that. 

v. He had paid £216,000 a year to his disadvantage and would, under the order, continue doing so indefinitely until the properties were sold.

vi. W could have applied for the properties to be sold at a lesser price.

vii. It was immaterial that H had done well financially since 2011 by his own endeavours.

viii. It was unfair to release one party from a reciprocal obligation.

ix. The best judge of fairness was what was agreed at the time.

x. The court would not release one party from one part only of a commercial agreement.

xi. W would not be left on the breadline and would still have pensions of £2m.

xii. It was matter of fluke that the obligation to repay was by way of undertaking rather than by order.  Had the order been drafted so that W was to repay H by way of a reverse lump sum it would not be variable.

W argued:

i. She had agreed to what would have provided her with a fund outside her home and pensions of at least £3m and perhaps as much as £4.5m.

ii. She would never have agreed to accept monthly payments by way of loan if it had ever been anticipated that it would have gone on for so long or the value of her fund would have been so dramatically reduced.

iii. It was never her intention to assume the risk.

iv. Unless she was given relief she might have no income fund at all and would be left with a property and pension fund she was too young to access.

v. There could hardly be a more dramatic change of circumstances than the facts.

vi. It was impossible for H to argue this produced an unfair result when his financial position was so much stronger.

vii. On an appeal the judge's ruling is only to be displaced if it is plainly wrong or has taken into account irrelevant material or omitted important material.

Giving judgment Cohen J rejected the arguments that:

i. W could have crystallised the situation by applying for an earlier sale. The judge had found neither had acted unreasonably in relation to the sale and it could not be assumed even if the price had been lowered it would have been to a price that the properties were found to sell.
ii. There was nothing in Birch which lead him to conclude the power to release from an undertaking was constrained by the limited circumstances which might qualify for a change under Barder or Myerson principles.

He found though that the judge failed to give sufficient regard to the fact the agreement was a highly material factor and was not lightly to be interfered with. Insofar as there was to a be a material change it should be kept to a minimum and the court should limit the release from undertaking to that which is necessary to avoid serious hardship or injustice.

There was clearly a significant change of circumstances but that did not lead inevitably to the release from an undertaking. The most significant factors which militated strongly in favour of replacement undertakings being given if W were to be released were:

i. The parties came to an agreement that was intended to be a clean break and a complete agreement.

ii. The order had in a number of respects already been put into effect.

iii. H had honoured the agreement and paid substantial sums to W in the expectation that he was going to be repaid.

The judge was entitled to take into account H's much improved finances in considering fairness to each party and was entitled in the exercise of her jurisdiction to conclude W should be discharged from her undertaking but that fairness to H required that replacement undertakings be put in place.

Cohen J declined to finalise the terms of the replacement undertaking within his judgment on the basis further information would be required and he would hear submissions on the matter. He noted in his judgment though that the following matters would be relevant to consider:

i. In a few years' time W will be entitled to her pension and to take a 25% tax free lump sum. He would require persuasion that she should not pay part or a significant element to H in part repayment of the debt.

ii. He would want to consider whether W's new property should not continue to carry an element of the mortgage so as to release funds to repay H.

iii. He would need persuasion it was just for H to be required to pay £12,000 pcm to the full extent, particularly when a Duxbury fund of £89,000 would equate to £7,400 pcm. He would want to have a close eye on W's budget to assess what was a reasonable sum going forward and her capital position to act as a check on the figure.  

March 2018