M’s contact with the child was limited to indirect contact only following a change of residence to F’s care as a result of concerns that M was undermining the child’s relationship with F and continued concerns that direct contact could not secure F’s safety or promote the welfare of the child until M undertook the necessary work.
This judgment was published by Her Honour Judge Cains sitting in the Family Court at Middlesbrough on 17 March 2026. On 23 February 2026 the court determined that the Defendant was in contempt of court having breached a Specific Issue Order (SIO) made on 2 January 2026 when he deliberately failed to return the child immediately to the Claimant’s care. The court had to make a Search and Return Order for the police to collect and return the child.
The father applied to have direct contact with the parties’ 9 year daughter following a failed application under Article 21 of the Hague Convention 1980. The mother cross-applied for orders restricting the father’s parental responsibility and for a Section 91(14) order.
This case concerned the welfare of JX, a child of 2 years old. This judgment relates to a fact-finding hearing which took place over 5 days. Both parties made a number of cross-allegations of domestic abuse, and the court made findings against both the mother and the father.
CoA once again and following Pringle v Nervo [2026] EWCA Civ 266 overturning a costs order made at a first instance appeal finding that the father had not conducted litigation in an unreasonable or reprehensible way despite being unsuccessful with his opposition to the mother’s first instance appeal and cross appeal from a Magistrates Decision.
Appeal by adoptive mother against decision that the court has no power to set aside a validly made adoption order, other than by way of appeal. Appeal dismissed
This is a judgment of HHJ Lazarus regarding an application made by the mother under s.34 of the Children Act in relation to her daughter, A, born in February 2017.
The Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal against a costs order made in private children proceedings that he should pay 75% (£385,587) towards the mother’s costs. The costs order was both made and substituted on account of the conduct threshold.
A father applied to enforce a child arrangements ‘spends time with’ order. The mother failed to engage and the child opposed contact. The Judge found the mother to be in breach of the order but made no other orders.
This case concerned an application by a father for an injunctive order under the inherent jurisdiction to “restrain any change of school or geographic location of the child including any preparatory steps, pending further order of the court, in order to preserve the status quo and enable judicial supervision of proposed irreversible steps”.
Appeal by local authority against parental contact order after placement for adoption. Appeal dismissed
Ms Justice Harris considered whether a judge sitting in the Family Court has jurisdiction to make an order dealing with publication from private Children Act proceedings where publication is not provided for by the current rules.
The Court of Appeal led by the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, affirmed the common law definition of father for the purposes of the Children Act 1989, and found that a non-genetic father does not acquire parental responsibility by virtue of being named in the child’s birth registration.
The court was asked to determine whether it was lawful for the Local Authority to rely on L’s parents’ consent to the care arrangements and restrictions where they amounted to a confinement within the meaning of limb a) of Storck. The Court found the parents’ consent amounted to valid consent under limb b) and, therefore, L was not being deprived of her liberty for the purposes of Article 5.
Financial remedies hearing, in which the issue was how much should be deducted from H’s entitlement of £6.4m under a pre-nuptial agreement ‘PNA’, having regard to his conduct and sums already received. H awarded £2.3m.
Private Children proceedings appeal. At first instance the court ignored allegations made by the M of domestic abuse. This was wrong, and despite the court being able to exercise discretion (at any stage) and review the relevance of the allegations, these were clearly relevant to the welfare outcome for the child. Further, insufficient reasoning was given to go behind the professional report / recommendation.
